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Torts: Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: The
United States Supreme Court Accepts the
Government Contractor Defense
The government contractor defense is an affirmative defense that a maufac-
turer may assert in actions for injuries caused by its product. When established,
the defense provides a contractor complete immunity against claims founded
upon negligence, strict products liability or breach of warranty.' The elements
of the government contractor defense remain the same no matter what theory
the plaintiff asserts. As with any affirmative defense, the party asserting the
defense has the burden of proving each element of the defense.
2
The government contractor defense has played a role in some of the 1980's
most highly publicized cases, including the Agent Orange3 and asbestos litiga-
tion.' The defense shields a product manufacturer from liability if the man-
facturer complies with design specifications set forth in a government procure-
ment contract. The effect of the defense is to allow a manufacturer to share
the government's sovereign immunity for damage resulting from carrying out
the contract according to its terms. Recently, the United States Supreme Court
re-affirmed the government contractor defense in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp. The purpose of this note is to examine the basis and effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in Boyle.
To aid in this endeavor, the underlying bases of the government contractor
defense must be explored. Furthermore, each major formulation of the defense
will be presented and analyzed. The policy considerations favoring the ex-
istence of the defense will also be examined. This note will also set forth the
defense's unresolved issues. Finally, this note will present a discussion of the
Boyle opinion itself. This will include an analysis of the present state of the
defense after Boyle.
Sovereign Immunity
The concept of sovereign immunity prohibits a citizen from suing the govern-
ment without its consent.' The government's immunity originated with the
idea that "the king can do no wrong." 6 In 1946, Congress waived the United
1. Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986) (negligence and strict products liability);
Casablanca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (warranty).
2. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
3. Id.
4. Hanson v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1051 (1985); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
5. As early as 1821, the United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine of sovereign
immunity to bar a claim brought against the federal government by a private citizen. Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411-12 (6 Wheat. 1821).
6. Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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States government's sovereign immunity for some tort claims by enacting the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA granted jurisdiction to the federal
district courts over suits for damages "caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government."' This provision has
been interpreted as precluding government liability based on strict liability
in tort.8
There are a number of exceptions to the government's waiver of sovereign
immunity under the FTCA. The Feres-Stencel doctrine represents such an ex-
ception. In addition, the discretionary function exception is another important
limitation on the FTCA's waiver of immunity. These two exceptions are par-
ticularly applicable to the government contractor defense.
The Feres-Stencel Exception
The Feres-Stencel doctrine is based on two Supreme Court decisions. The
first decision, Feres v. United States,9 involved appeals of three cases with
common issues under the FTCA. Each suit was brought by a serviceman
against the United States for injuries received in noncombatant activities."
In Feres, the Court determined the scope of the FTCA language that does
not permit claims "arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.""II Although the plain-
tiff's injuries in Feres were not received in combat, the Court extended the
FTCA's application to include noncombatant activities. It held that the govern-
ment cannot be sued under the FTCA by a member of the Armed Forces
for injuries arising out of or "in the course of activity incident to [military]
service.'" I
Twenty-seven years later, the Supreme Court again broadened the scope
of the government's immunity under Feres. In Stencel Aerospace Engineering
Corp. v. United States," a serviceman was injured while trying to eject from
an aircraft during an emergency. He brought a products liability action against
the United States and Stencel, the manufacturer of the aircraft. Stencel cross-
claimed against the United States for indemnity. However, the Court held
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
8. Daelhite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 45 (1953).
9. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
10. In Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), a serviceman was killed in a
barracks fire. In Jefferson v, United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), and United States
v. Griggs, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), negligence on the part of army surgeons were the alleged
causes of the soldiers' injuries.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976).
12. 340 U.S. at 146. The Court rested its decision on three principles that are still persuasive,
First, the "distinctively federal" nature of the relationship between soldiers and the government
requires that federal law rather than the variations in state law determine servicemen's substan-
tive rights. Id. at 143. Furthermore, a system for compensating members of the Armed Forces
for injuries or death already exists under the Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 355 (1976).
Id. at 145. Finally, claims against the government would impair military discipline because it
would entail a soldier questioning the legitimacy of a superior's order. Id. at 112.
13. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
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that a manufacturer under contract with the United States is prohibited from
bringing an indemnity action against the government."
In summary, the Feres-Stencel doctrine provides that an accident causing
injury or death to military personnel cannot be the basis of an FTCA claim
against the United States, either by the victim or by private defendants seek-
ing indemnity. Thus, the United States is not liable either directly or indirectly
for injuries to servicemen during military service.
The Discretionary Function Exception
Another important exception to the government's waiver of sovereign im-
munity involves the government's exercise of a discretionary function.' 5 Sec-
tion 2680(a) of the FTCA provides that the United States' waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply to "[a]ny claim... based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused." 16 The discretionary function exception pro-
tects the executive branch of the government against unjustified judicial in-
terference."' The government contractor defense also protects the same in-
terest. '
In Daelhite v. United States,'9 the Supreme Court defined a government
discretionary function as an action requiring a "policy judgment and deci-
sion." 2 0 Daelhite arose out of an explosion in the port area of Texas City.
A cargo vessel, loaded with fertilizer manufactured from explosive compounds,
exploded while in port, causing deaths and property damage. A number of
suits were brought against the government, alleging negligence in the produc-
tion and bagging of the fertilizer. However, the Court held that § 2680(a)
of the FTCA barred claims arising from the explosion because the produc-
tion and bagging were mandated by decisions made at the planning rather
than the operational level. 2' This planning-operational distinction remains the
most widely used formula for determining when a suit is barred by the discre-
tionary function rule.
22
14. 431 U.S. at 669. The Court explained: "To permit [Stencell to proceed ... would be
to judicially admit at the back door that which has been legislatively turned away at the front
door. We do not believe that the [Federal Tort Claims] Act permits such a result." Id. at 673
(quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972)).
15. The discretionary function exception was used by Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States
to support the government contractor defense in a public works case. See infra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
17. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "'Discretion," 57 TinL. L. Rv. 776, 807 (1983).
18. See Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1982); Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43, 47 (Law Div. 1976), affd, 154 N.J. Super. 407,
381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977).
19. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
20. Id. at 36.
21. Id. at 42.
22. See Note, The Government Contract Defense in Strict Liability Suits for Defective Design,
48 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 1030, 1034 (1981).
1989]
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A dozen years after Daelhite established the planning-operational distinc-
tion, in Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States,23 the government's immunity
was applied to a government contractor who was merely carrying out the will
of the sovereign. In Dolphin Gardens, the court held that a contractor who
acts pursuant to the government's discretionary authority is immune from
liability if the plaintiff's injury is "the result of an affirmative decision by
the government to act or not to act."1
2 4
The concerns of the discretionary function exception and the Feres-Stencel
doctrine include: controlling the cost of government procurement contracts;
maintaining military autonomy and discipline; and protecting the integrity of
government decision-making. 25 These concerns are similar to those of the
government contractor defense. 26 Therefore, the prior discussion of these doc-
trines, together with a historical look at the government contractor defense,
should provide insight into the underlying rationale for the defense.
History of the Government Contractor Defense
The origin of the government contractor defense is found in the principles
first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross
Construction Co.27 There, immunity was extended to a company acting on
behalf of the government. Ross Construction, pursuant to a government con-
tract, built dikes on the Missouri River to divert its flow. Yearsley brought
an inverse condemnation action against Ross, alleging that the diversion had
caused the loss of ninety-five acres of his land.
The Court found Ross not liable, analogizing Ross' position to that of an
"agent or officer" of the government. 28 The Court stated that as long as the
"authority to carry out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what
was done was done within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no
liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will." 29 Although the
Yearsley decision was a forerunner of the government contractor defense, it
failed to provide any guidelines for determining when a contractor is entitled
to share the government's immunity. Thus, in the early existence of the defense,
a contractor merely had to show that the work it performed complied with
the terms of the government contract to receive immunity from suit.3'
23. 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965). In Dolphin Gardens, a government contractor dredged
a river channel and deposited the dredged material onto a vacant lot near the plaintiff's land.
After fumes from this material caused damage to the plaintiff's buildings, a suit was brought
against the government and the contractor. The district court granted both defendants' motions
to dismiss, stating that the government's decisions regarding the dredging and dumping were
"within the scope of 'discretionary functions.' " Id. at 826.
24. Id. at 827.
25. See Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and Products Liabil-
ity, 47 G1Uo ST. L.J. 985, 986 (1986).
26. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
27. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
28. Id. at 20-21.
29. Id. at 21.
30. See Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963) (roads); Green v. ICI
America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (explosives); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United
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After Yearsley, the existence of the government contractor defense was
recognized in a series of cases arising from public works projects. Most of
these cases involved claims for damage to land and other property.3 1 Recently,
the defense has been invoked to avoid liability to third parties injured by defec-
tively designed products supplied to the government. 2 A few courts have flatly
rejected the defense in product liability cases.
33
The first case suggesting an application of the defense to military contrac-
tors being sued for design defects was Littlehale v. E.L du Pont de Nemours
& Co.3" Although the case was decided on other grounds, the court stated
in a footnote that a government contractor defense had merit.
3 5
Although many early cases accepted the government contractor defense,
their impact was lessened due to the courts' failure to set out the necessary
elements of the defense. Few courts adopted the defense in the area of pro-
ducts liability until specific elements were enunciated. 36
States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965) (river dredging). In one early case, however,
a court refused to apply the defense because the government contracted only for an outcome
and gave the contractor the discretion to determine how to achieve that outcome. Merritt, Chapman
& Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961).
31. See supra note 30.
32. In 1976, a New Jersey state court became the first to recognize the government contractor
defense in a products liability case. In Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d
43 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), a serviceman
who was injured after being thrown from an Army jeep brought suit against Ford, the manufac-
turer. Sanner alleged that the jeep was defectively designed because it lacked seat belts and a roll-bar.
In 1980, a New York court recognized the defense in Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc.
2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981). In Casablanca, a boy
was hurt when he caught his hand in the blades of a dough mixer in his father's pizza shop.
The mixer had been manufactured pursuant to government specifications for use in Army field
kitchens during World War II.
An explanation for this expansion is that strict liability and breach of implied warranty joined
negligence as theories of liability for providers of goods. On the other hand, those providing
services could only be held liable under traditional negligence concepts. Because of the expand-
ing liability for producers of goods, more cases began to involve the sales of goods to the govern-
ment rather than the providing of services to the government. See Zollers, Rethinking the Govern-
ment Contract Defense, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 405, 408-09 (1986).
33. Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on other
grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
34. 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1976) (products liability
action arising from the premature explosion of a blasting cap).
35. Specifically, the court stated:
[W]here a party contracts with the Government and the Government specifies the
means by which the product is to be manufactured and other details incident to
the production, the manufacturer's acts in accordance with the plans are at the
very least not measurable by the same tests applicable to a manufacturer having
sole discretion over the method of manufacture, and at the most are insulated from
any liability.
Id. at 803 n.17.
36. This occurred in Agent Orange. See infra notes 37-68 and accompanying text.
1989]
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Elements of the Government Contractor Defense
The first major formulation of the government contractor defense was given
in 1982 by a New York District Court. In re Agent Orange Product Liability
Litigation37 was a class action products liability case brought on behalf of
Vietnam War veterans and their families. The plaintiffs alleged injury from
exposure to the chemical defoliant Agent Orange. The district court originally
set forth three elements for the defense:
(1) the government must have established the specifications for the product;
(2) the product must have met the government's specifications in all material
respects; and
(3) the government must have known as much or more about the hazards
to people that accompanied the use of the product than the manufac-
turer.31
The district court later modified the third element of the test due to the
unique facts of the Agent Orange case. 39 The third element now provides that
upon a plaintiffs proof that the contractor knew or reasonably should have
known of the product's hazards; the contractor must then demonstrate either
that the government knew about the dangers, or would have ordered produc-
tion of the product despite the hazards.
4 0
Another variation of the government contractor defense was given in McKay
v. Rockwell International Corp. 4 McKay involved consolidated wrongful death
actions arising out of the deaths of two naval pilots who ejected from burn-
ing aircrafts. The Ninth Circuit characterized the elements of the defense as
follows:
(1) the government must be immune from liability under the Feres-Stencel
doctrine;
(2) the government must have established or approved reasonably precise
specifications for the product;
(3) the product must have conformed to those specifications; and
37. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. N.Y. 1982). Although the parties to Agent Orange eventually
settled the case for $180,000,000, the test laid down in that case became one of the major judicial
formulations of the government contractor defense.
38. Id. at 1055. The court believed it was unfair to hold contractors liable for the govern-
ment's defective design, particularly when the military contractors were compelled to produce
the equipment. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 793. However, later courts refused to accept
the idea of compulsion as an element of the defense. See, e.g., Bynum, 770 F.2d 556, 574-75
(5th Cir. 1985); Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14 (9th
Cir. 1961); Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Sanner
v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 304 A.2d 43 (1977), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381
A.2d 805.
39. The components of Agent Orange had long been used as herbicides in the civilian market.
Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 849.
40. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D. N.Y. 1984).
41. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 42
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/9
NOTES
(4) the contractor must have warned the government about patent errors
in its specifications or about dangers involved in the use of the product
that were known to the contractor but not to the government. 42
In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit established yet another formula for the govern-
ment contractor defense, in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.13 Instead
of following either the McKay or the Agent Orange formulation of the defense,
the court provided a new test, resting it on separation of powers concerns.
44
This test was more restrictive than the McKay formulation .4 The Shaw court
provided that:
A contractor may escape liability only if it affirmatively proves:
(1) that it did not participate, or participated only minimally, in
the design of those products or parts of products shown to be defec-
tive; or (2) that it timely warned the military of the risks of the
design and notified it of alternative designs reasonably known by
the contractor, and that the military, although forewarned, clearly
authorized the contractor to proceed with the dangerous design.46
Government Immunity
The McKay formulation of the government contractor defense provides that
a contractor would be immune only if the United States would also be im-
mune from liability under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. In order for the govern-
ment to be immune from liability under Feres-Stencel, the plaintiff must be
a member of the armed forces, injured in the course of activity incident to
military service. Thus, those courts utilizing the McKay formulation restrict
the application of the defense to contracts involving the military.
The Design Specifications
The Agent Orange formulation includes the requirement that a government
contractor prove that the government established the specifications for the
42. Id. at 451.
43. 778 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1985). Shaw was a wrongful death action arising out of a fatal
crash of a Navy airplane. Grumman, the manufacturer of a defective flight control system in
the airplane, asserted the government contractor defense.
44. Id. at 741-44. The court never referred to the defense as the government contractor defense,
instead preferring "military contractor defense" as a more descriptive and precise term. Id. at
739 n.3.
45. The Shaw test does not allow as great a level of contractor participation as does McKay.
Under Shaw, a contractor who establishes the specifications for the product fails to meet the
test because its participation is more than "minimal." Under McKay, however, a contractor
who established the specifications may invoke the defense as long as the government approved
those specifications.
46. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746. More recently, in an opinion handed down the same day as Boyle,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the Shaw court's more restricted version of the defense. In Tozer
v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), a wrongful death action brought by the family
of a Navy pilot killed in a plane crash, the court adopted the McKay standard.
19891
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product. However, the court drew a broad distinction between performance
and design specifications. It stated that "[i]f... the contract set[s] forth merely
a 'performance specification,' 7 as opposed to a specific product, then the
government contractor defense will be far more restricted ....,"" Thus, the
court was willing to allow the defense when the contractor had some involve-
ment in the product's design. By restricting the defense, rather than denying
it, when a contractor has some input into the design of the product, the court
recognized that a government contractor frequently creates the actual design
specifications, subject to approval by the government.
The McKay test expands the specification requirement by allowing the
defense to apply if the government either establishes or approves reasonably
precise specifications. This element allows the application of the defense even
if the contractor exercises some influence over the product's design. Under
this element, the defense will apply if the government reviews and approves
a detailed set of specifications developed by the contractor.
49
The critical difference between the McKay and Agent Orange tests is that
McKay allows mere government approval of a contractor's design to shield
the contractor from liability. Thus, under McKay, contractors may invoke
the government contractor defense even when the contract specifications did
not originate with the government. Agent Orange does not make such an
allowance. Agent Orange does, however, allow a "restricted" defense where
a contractor supplied specifications that the government subsequently
approved. 0
Sometimes, the government officials and contractors engage in a "back and
forth" process of negotiation over the specifications. In such a situation, it
may be difficult to ascertain where the specifications originated. Nevertheless,
some courts have allowed the contractor to invoke the defense in these cir-
cumstances.' Those courts allowing contractor discretion in producing design
47. Performance specifications give the desired performance characteristics for the product
to be manufactured. The contractor is given discretion as to the manner in which those
characteristics are to be accomplished. See Aerodex, Inc. v. United States, 1962 BCA (CCH)
3492 at 17,822, rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
48. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. at 1056. Unfortunately, the
court did not provide exactly how "restricted" the defense becomes if a specification is deemed
to be a "performance specification" rather than a "specified product."
49. McKay, 704 F.2d at 464. ("When only minimal or very general requirements are set for
the contractor by the United States the rule is inapplicable.").
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985). Accord Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d
413, 414-15 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 56 U.S.L.W. 4792 (U.S. June 27, 1988);
Price v. Tempo., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1985). In Koutsoubos, Boeing propos-
ed changes of detailed specifications for a helicopter formulated by the Navy. This "initiated
a 'back-and-forth' discussion [between the two], with the Navy undertaking all final decisions
as to the helicopter's specifications." Koutsoubos, 533 F. Supp. at 343-44.
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specifications have justified the rule on the basis that contractor participation
in the design process is an important goal."
Even the courts that have accepted the McKay "approval" standard re-
quire more than a cursory review by the government of the contractor's
specifications. Rather, the government must have played a significant role
in developing the specifications. Thus, the government cannot merely "rubber
stamp" the contractor's design specifications." Instead, the government must
evaluate the specifications closely enough to equate the level of expertise
necessary to prepare them.
5 4
Conformance with the Specifications
In order to successfully assert the government contractor defense, a con-
tractor must prove that the product it manufactured met the government
specifications in all material respects.5 - Thus, the defense does not apply in
cases of manufacturing defects. 5' Rather, it applies only in cases of design
defects. The conformance element is relatively straightforward, and not many
cases have discussed it.
However, it has been determined that conformance is a question of fact
that requires "a comparison of the government's specifications for the [pro-
duct] with the characteristics and quality of the product supplied." ' 57 Evidence
that the product that caused the injury was accepted by the government after
a thorough inspection has been held to satisfy this element of the defense.5
A contractor's performance is nonconforming "if the discrepancy between
specifications and product [is] a material one."'5 9 To be "material," a varia-
tion must be causally related to the accident giving rise to the lawsuit. 60
Knowledge of Product's Dangers
The final element of the government contractor defense involves the parties'
relative knowledge of the hazards associated with the product. This element,
as originally devised by the Agent Orange court, was satisfied only if the
52. One court acknowledged the importance of contractor participation in the design of
sophisticated military weapons:
We recognize this back-and-forth as a reality of the procurement process, as well
as a valuable part of that process; indeed if the military technology is to continue
to incorporate the advances of science, it needs the uninhibited assistance of private
contractors.
Tozer v. LTV, Inc., 792 F.2d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 1986).
53. See Shaw, 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985). See also supra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
54. Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 626 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
55. See infra notes 38, 42 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
57. Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
58. Black v. Fairchild Indus., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 11022 (E.D. N.Y. 1986).
59. Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
60. Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415, 504 A.2d 908 (1986).
19891
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government knew as much or more than the contractor about the potential
hazards of the product. 61
The Agent Orange court extended this element of the defense to require
the contractor to prove that the government knew as much about the dangers
of the product as the contractor knew or should have known. 62 After the
government has been fully informed about the risks of a design, it may decide
to accept these risks after balancing them with the benefit of the product.
After the contractor proves this element, the burden shifts to the defendant
to disprove the element or to prove that even if the government had as much
knowledge as the defendant should have had, it would have ordered produc-
tion anyway and would not have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the
hazard.6 3 "Reasonable knowledge" does not mean "infinite knowledge."
Rather, a design risk would be considered to be reasonably known according
to industry standards and the level of the contractor's expertise.
64
Under the Shaw test, a contractor may escape liability by proving that it
warned the government of the reasonably known risks of the design and of
the existence of alternative designs. Furthermore, the contractor must show
that the government clearly authorized the contractor to go ahead with the
more dangerous design.65 However, the authorization must be "knowing,"
and a mere "rubber stamp" approval will not suffice. 66
Both Agent Orange and Shaw adopted the "should have known" test for
knowledge of a product's risks. However, many courts have adopted the ac-
61. The Agent Orange court justified this element by stating:
A supplier should not be insulated from liability for damages that would never
have occurred if the military had been apprised of hazards known to the supplier.
A supplier, therefore, has a duty to inform the military of known risks attendant
to a particular weapon that it supplies, so as to provide the military with at least
an opportunity fairly to balance the weapon's risks and benefits.
The principle would not impose upon a supplier any duty of testing that was
not included in the specifications. It merely would require the supplier to share
with the military the extent of a supplier's knowledge about the hazards of the
product being purchased.
Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
62. This additional duty to warn was meant to discourage contractors from deliberately re-
maining ignorant about the dangers of a product. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 849.
63. Id. at 847-49. However, the difficulty of discovering information as to what the govern-
ment "knew" was recognized in Mackey v. Maremont, 504 A.2d 908, 914 n.l (Pa. Super. 1986):
"In our view, a comparison of relative degrees of knowledgeability of the government and the
contractor is both abstract and difficult of proof. As such, we reject it as an unmanageable
requirement."
64. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746. See also Note, Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense:
Are Military Manufacturers Immune from Products Liability?, 36 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 489, 501-02
(1984).
65. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746.
66. Id. In Shaw, the trial court had determined that the Navy did not make a detailed check
of Grumman's design data to determine whether it was safe. Shaw, 593 F. Supp. 1066, 1077
(S.D. Fla. 1984).
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tual knowledge standard of McKay.6" One court stated that the "should have
known" test would require a contractor to evaluate the government's design
specifications and engage in design testing not required under the procure-
ment contract. That court reasoned that testing decisions should be left to
the military.
6
Policy Considerations Or "Why the Government
Walks Free From Liability"
Virtually every government contractor case contains a discussion of the pur-
poses served by the existence of the defense. Collectively, the courts have iden-
tified four groups of policy justifications for the defense. Because judicial
doctrines are based upon their underlying policies, an examination of these
policies is warranted.
Innovation and Cooperation
A major policy behind the government contractor defense is that it en-
courages a close working relationship between contractors and the govern-
ment in developing and producing military equipment. 6 9 In the absence of
the defense, contractor participation in design and in research and develop-
ment would decrease. Arguably if military technology is to continue to incor-
porate advances of science, it needs the assistance of private contractors.7 °
Another justification for the government contractor defense is that in
developing military products, the government is required to push technology
towards its limits, thus incurring risks considered unacceptable for ordinary
consumer goods. 71 Often the government simply chooses to accept the risks
associated with the production of technologically advanced military equip-
ment. 72 Without the government contractor defense, contractors might be
discouraged from manufacturing dangerous equipment for the government
because they would be unwilling to accept the increased chance of liability.73
67. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1985). Accord Tillett v. J.I. Case
Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755
F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1986).
68. Bynum, 770 F.2d at 576. (court reasoning that such testing would result in delays and
increased costs not contemplated by the parties to the procurement contract).
69. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449-50; Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354-55.
70. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 407.
71. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354-55 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1986).
72. Courts have allowed the government the liberty to decide whether a particular risk is
acceptable. See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1985);
Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986).
73. However, many technologically advanced consumer products are developed despite the
fact that product liability law does not protect the non-government product developer. Thus,
it may be argued that this lack of immunity for non-government producers does not discourage
manufacturers from developing products on the cutting edge of technology.
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This unwillingness would arguably impair the government's ability to provide
for the national defense.
74
Protection of Sovereign Immunity
The oldest reason for the government contractor defense is that it is necessary
to preserve sovereign immunity. 7" Courts have long recognized that in the
absence of the government contractor defense, contractors would pass the
costs of their liability on to the government in the form of cost overrun pro-
visions or through higher prices in later equipment sales to the government. 6
The government contractor defense protects the policy of sovereign immunity
by preventing the government from absorbing the costs of damages from design
defects. 77 Without the defense, the Feres-Stencel doctrine would be subverted
because the government would, in effect, pay for injuries caused by products
procured through government contracts. 78
Separation of Powers
To hold military suppliers liable for defective designs where the govern-
ment set or approved the design specifications, would thrust the judiciary into
the making of military decisions. 79 Such an intrusion into the legislative and
executive branches of government has been held to violate the separation of
powers doctrine as an imposition upon military autonomy.8" Furthermore,
74. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742. However, it has been argued that manufacturers would not be
discouraged from selling military equipment to the government if they obtain liability insurance
and could raise their contract prices to cover the insurance premiums. See Comment, Surrogate
Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and Products Liability, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 985,
1011 (1986).
75. This concern was first voiced by a Connecticut district court in Dolphin Gardens, Inc.,
see infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., McKay, 704 F.2d at 449. On the other hand, contractors with good safety
records could obtain liability insurance for lower rates than could their competitors. Thus, the
safer contractors could make lower bids and pass the benefits of safety, rather than the cost
of liability, to the government. See id. at 457 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the govern-
ment would also benefit from lower accident costs because only safe contractors would be manufac-
turing products for the government. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736,
741-42 (11th Cir. 1985).
77. However, it has been argued that because the defense does not shield contractors from
liability for manufacturing defects, the defense does not prevent the government from suffering
increased costs. The logic is that contractors will raise their prices to account for the chance
of liability for the defective manufacture of the government's product. See Johnston v. United
States, 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
78. This argument was criticized in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th
Cir. 1985). There, the court stated that the cost pass-through rationale is based on an outdated
interpretation of Feros-Stencel and a strained reading of Stencel. The court relied on United
States v. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 3043 n.4 (1985), which stated that the original reasons for
the Feres-Stencel limitation of government liability (other than the preservation of military discipline)
are "no longer controlling."
79. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984).
80. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406-08 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1985).
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trials involving such issues would involve the second-guessing of military
judgments concerning the equipping of the armed services.81 This could im-
pair military discipline because the suit might involve a soldier testifying against
a superior.8" Finally, civilian courts are not considered competent to make
decisions concerning military equipment.83 Therefore, deference has generally
been given to military decisions regarding military procurements.
Fairness
Finally, simple fairness dictates that liability should not be imposed on an
otherwise innocent contractor, whose only role in causing an injury to a third
party was the production of a design supplied by the government.84 Put another
way, a government contractor neither creates nor controls the product sup-
plied to the government." Tort law places liability on the wrongdoer in order
to deter persons from engaging in potentially injurious practices.86 However,
a contractor is not able to prevent injury to users of the product because
it must follow government specifications.
Because the responsibility for the dangerous design lies elsewhere, the im-
position of products liability would have little deterrent value. Therefore, liabil-
ity on the part of a contractor is considered inappropriate. 7 This reasoning
is strengthened by the fact that injured military personnel are at least partially
81. See, e.g., Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1054 n.1, where the court stated, "Considera-
tions of cost, time of production, risk to participants, risks to third parties, and any other factor
that might weigh on the decisions of whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon, are
uniquely questions for the military and should be exempt from review by civilian courts."
82. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
83. See id. See also Tozer v. LTV, Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986), where the
court vividly stated this proposition: "While jurors may possess familiarity and experience with
consumer products, it would be the rare juror or judge who has been in the cockpit of a Navy
RF-8G off the deck of a carrier on a low level, high speed fly-by maneuver." But see In re
Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany, 586 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d
115, cert. denied sub nom., Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S. Ct. 851 (1986) (court stating that
not all decisions regarding the design of military equipment involve military judgments and "[m]any
military products such as aircraft, vehicles, firearms, and explosives have civilian counterparts").
Zollers, Rethinking the Government Contract Defense, 24 AmER. Bus. L.J. 405, 418-19 (1986).
84. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 793. But see Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp.
351, 358 (D. Kan. 1983) (court stating "[t]he manufacturer will not always be 'innocent,' par-
ticularly when he has had substantial input into the product's design: indeed, where the manufac-
turer is the 'de facto' designer or has substantially greater sophistication than the government
purchaser, the manufacturer may be more culpable than the ostensible designer.").
85. On the other hand, testimony in recent cases indicates that contractors often have as
active a role in setting the design specifications as does the government. See Koutsoubos v. Boeing
Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985) (continuous back-and-forth be-
tween contractor and government); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 256 (3d
Cir. 1982) (ongoing dealings between contractor and government).
86. Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 793.
87. Bynum v. General Motors Corp., 599 F. Supp. 155, 157 (N.D. Miss. 19.84), aff'd, 770
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
1989]
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ompensated through veterans benefits. Thus, the government contractor
defense does not protect the contractor completely at the expense of the in-
jured party.
Questions Left Unanswered
Nonmilitary Products
Disagreement exists concerning whether the government contractor defense
is limited to military equipment or whether manufacturers of nonmilitary
equipment may invoke the defense. Some courts have made specific reference
to "military equipment" 88 or "military contractors." 89 Thus, one argument
is that such language implicitly limits the application of the defense to military
equipment.90 Indeed, the McKay court expressly held that the defense is not
warranted in cases involving nonmilitary products.9' However, two decisions
subsequent to McKay failed to reach a similar conclusion.
92
Limiting the defense's application to cases involving military equipment raises
the problem of defining that term. For example, in McKay, the Ninth Circuit
was unable to precisely state what distinguishes military and nonmilitary pro-
ducts: "The line ... lies somewhere between an ordinary consumer product
purchased by the armed forces-a can of beans, for example-and the escape
system of a Navy RA-5C reconnaissance aircraft. ' 93 In addition to the dif-
ficulty in defining the term "military equipment," categorizing products that
are used by both the military and by consumers is a problem. The cases to
date suggest that courts are willing to accept as "military products," many
civilian products that were modified to meet government needs.9 '
88. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Germany, 769 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom., Eschler v. Boeing Co., 106 S. Ct. 851 (1984); Tillett v. J.1. Case
Co., 756 F.2d 591, 598 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litigation, 506 F.
Supp. 762, 794 (E.D. N.Y. 1980).
89. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1985).
90. Some courts expressly reserve judgment as to whether the defense applies to manufac-
turers of non-military products. See, e.g., Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co.,
755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1986); Casabianca v. Casabianca,
104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981).
91. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1043 (1984). Accord Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D. Kan. 1983)
(refusing to apply the defense to radium dials designed for aircraft); Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp.,
551 F. Supp. 110, 114 (D. Haw. 1982) (refusing to apply the defense to an atomic simulator
that was "not a device used as a weapon").
92. Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985) (court allowing the
manufacturer of a calf serum to assert the government contractor defense and stating: "[It would
be illogical to limit the availability of the defense solely to 'military' contractors."); Price v.
Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (McKay limitation rejected in allowing
defense by manufacturer of firefighters' coats and gloves).
93. 704 F.2d at 451.
94. The term "nmilitary products" has been recognized as including pizza dough mixers
(Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d
1117 (1981)), jeeps (Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/9
An objection to limiting the government contractor defense to military pro-
ducts is that such a restriction is inconsistent with the discretionary function
exception." That is, the procurement of nonmilitary products is as much a
discretionary function as is the procurement of military equipment. Thus, the
defense "should not be limited to military equipment but should include any
design choice that involves an exercise of government discretion.
' 96
Civilian Plaintiffs
Another unresolved issue is whether the government contractor defense may
be invoked in cases brought by civilian plaintiffs. The McKay court answered
no to this question by making government immunity under Feres-Stencel an
element of the defense. Because Feres-Stencel applies only to injured ser-
vicemen, it does not bar claims by civilians. Thus, courts, such as McKay,
that ground the defense on the Feres-Stencel doctrine limit application of the
defense to cases brought by military plaintiffs. However, neither the Agent
Orange nor the Shaw formulation of the defense has the requirement that
the government be immune from suit under Feres-Stencel." Moreover, some
courts have allowed a contractor to invoke the defense against civilian plain-
tiffs. 98
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.99 arose out of the crash of a Marine
helicopter in the ocean near Virginia Beach. Boyle, the copilot of the
helicopter, drowned when he was unable to get out of the aircraft through
emergency exits.' 0 Boyle's family brought suit against Sikorsky, the manufac-
turer of the helicopter,'"' alleging that the copilot's escape hatch was defec-
aff'd, 154 N.J. Super 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977)), bulldozers (Brown v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 692 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982)), chemical herbicides (In re Agent Orange Products
Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)), and front-end loaders (Tillett v. J.I.
Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985)).
95. See Ausness, Surrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and Products Liabil-
ity, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 985, 1016 (1986).
96. Id. This would allow the defense to apply to products such as Post Office trucks, Coast
Guard helicopters, and National Park Service off-road vehicles. Id. at 1016 n.249.
97. It has been suggested, however, that although these versions of the defense "do not list
the government's immunity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine as a prerequisite to the government
contractor defense, the immunity appears to be assumed." Turner & Sutin, The Government
Contractor Defense: Liability for Design Defects?, 52 J. Am L. & Comm. 397, 422 (1986). "Whether
or not courts specifically list Feres-Stencel immunity as a separate and distinct element, it seems
clear that such immunity must exist before the defense will apply in a military products liability
case." Id. at 422 n.156.
98. See, e.g., Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985) (veterinarian
plaintiff); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (fireman plaintiff); Casabianca
v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 1117 (1981)
(plaintiff was young boy).
99. 56 U.S.L.W. 4792 (U.S. June 27, 1988).
100. Id. at 4793.
101. Sikorsky was a division of United Technologies Corp.
NO TES19891
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tively designed. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Boyle's family."0 2 After
the trial court denied Sikorsky's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, Sikorsky appealed.'
0 3
The Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court and remanded the case with direc-
tions that judgment be entered for Sikorsky.0 4 It found as a matter of law
that Sirkorsky could not be held liable because it satisfied the requirements
of the government contractor defense.105 Boyle's family petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, contending that there was no
justification in federal law for the defense and, alternatively, that even if the
defense should exist, the Fourth Circuit's version of the defense was inap-
propriate." 6
When the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, the elements of
the government contractor defense were indeed an area ripe for resolution.t°0
There were three major judicial formulations of the defense. Boyle was the
Supreme Court's first opportunity to craft its own version of the defense.
But before the Court could examine the defense itself, it had to determine
if there was a basis for a recognition of the defense by a federal court.
Pre-emption of State Law
Normally, in the absence of statutory prescription, state law is applied to
diversity cases. This is the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins."0 This
rule prevents federal courts from making federal common law. However, in
some instances, federal law will pre-empt state law.
To determine whether federal law will pre-empt state law, the Supreme Court
fashioned a test in Clearfield Trust v. United States.'09 Under this test, federal
law will prevail if uniquely federal interests are involved and a federal policy
or interest and the operation of state law are in conflict." 0 This was the test
employed by the Boyle court to determine whether the scope and nature of
the government contractor defense should be governed by federal or state law.
102. Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4793.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The circuit court followed its earlier ruling in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. filed, Oct. 23, 1986, which adopted the government contractor defense
formulation of McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., discussed infra at notes 37-68 and accompanying
text.
106. Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4793.
107. See supra notes 37-68 and accompanying text.
108. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
109. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
110. Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4793-94 (citing Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366-67). It should
be noted that the Clearfield Trust test included a third element - the federal interest must outweigh
the state interest involved. 318 U.S. at 366-67. The Boyle Court did not include this element
in its analysis of the preemption issue. It is possible that implicit in the Court's reasoning was
a determination that the federal interest in protecting the policy decisions of its officials outweighs
the competing state interest in compensating its tort victims.
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In a 5-4 decision, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for the court."' He
began by examining areas of "unique federal interest." Two such areas were
identified. The first was "[o]bligations to and rights of the United States under
its contracts.""' 2 Another area found to be of federal concern was "the civil
liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty."'" 3
Both of these areas are controlled by federal law.1" However, these interests
were not present in Boyle.1"
Out of the two areas found to be of federal interest, the Court derived
a new area of federal interest-the interest in the liabilities arising out of the
performance of federal procurement contracts." ' The Court recognized that
in Yearsley,'" federal law was applied to a government performance con-
tract. The Court reasoned that "[t]he federal interest justifying this holding
surely exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance con-
tracts . . . .
11. He was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
Justice Brennan dissented and was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. A separate dissent
was filed by Justice Stevens.
112. Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4793.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Instead, Boyle involved a contractor's tort liability to an injured serviceman rather than
its contractual obligation to the government. Furthermore, it involved a contractor's performance
of a procurement contract rather than a federal official's performance of his duties. Id.
116. Id. at 4794. This creation of a new area of unique federal interests did not escape criticism
by the dissent. Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, stated:
[T]he Court does not pretend that its newly manufactured Government contractor
defense fits within any of the handful of "narrow areas" of "uniquely federal
interests" in which we have heretofore done so. Rather, the Court creates a new
category of "uniquely federal interest" out of a synthesis of two whose origins
pre-date Erie itself .... [T]he court's ability to list two, or three, inapplicable
areas of "uniquely federal interest" does not support its conclusion that the liability
of Government contractors is so "clear and substantial" an interest that this Court
must step in lest state law does "major damages."
Id. at 4797 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
118. Boyle at 4794. Moreover, the federal interest in the procurement of equipment was found
to be affected by suits between private parties, such as in Boyle. "The imposition of liability
on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts; either the
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise
its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly affected." Id.
Brennan's dissent strongly criticized the majority for extending Yearsley beyond a takings con-
text. He doubted that such a result was intended by Yearsley, stating:
In a valiant attempt to bridge the analytical canyon between what Yearsley said
and what the Court wishes it had said, the Court invokes the discretionary func-
tion exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The Court
does not suggest that the exception has any direct bearing here, for petitioner has
sued a private manufacturer (not the Federal Government) under Virginia law (not
the FTCA).
Id. at 4799 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The finding that the procurement of equipment by the United States was
an area of unique federal interest only satisfied the first element of the Clear-
field test. Thus, the Court had to determine whether a significant conflict
between federal and state law existed in Boyle."19 The Court examined the
Feres-Stencel doctrine as a possible means of determining when a significant
conflict exists. 2 The Court stated that the defense should not be based upon
Feres-Stencel because it would produce results that are both too broad and
too narrow.' The results would be too broad because liability against
manufacturers would be precluded even if the serviceman was injured by stan-
dard equipment purchased by the government.' 22 On the other hand, the results
would be too narrow because the defense could not be invoked to prevent
civilians from bringing suit against the manufacturers of military equipment.'23
Finally, the Court held that the FTCA's discretionary function exception
"demonstrates the potential for, and suggests the outlines of, 'significant con-
flict' between federal interests and state law in the context of government
procurement."' 24 The discretionary function exception assures that the defense
only applies when the government has exercised a discretionary function-the
approval of the specifications. 2' If the defense was not recognized in such
instances, the discretionary function exception would be frustrated. 2 6 Thus,
Virginia products liability law, which imposes liability on manufacturers for
design defects, was displaced in favor of the government contractor defense.
2 7
The Boyle Formulation of the Defense
After determining that federal law could shield a contractor from liability
under the government contractor defense, the Court set forth the elements
119. The Court noted that the conflict between federal policy and state law "need not be
as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary preemption when Congress legislates in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied." Id. at 4794.
120. This was the limiting principle identified by Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir.
1986), the case which Boyle ultimately accepted as the proper formulation of the government
contractor defense. See supra note 105.
121. Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4795.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In approving the specifications, the government must make a "judgment as to the balanc-
ing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including the trade-off between
greater safety and greater combat effectiveness." Id. These policy judgments or decisions are
discretionary functions. See discussion of Daelhite v. United States, supra at notes 19-22 and
accompanying text.
126. "The financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed
through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself.. . ." Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4795.
127. Id. Most courts which have addressed this issue agree that federal law should be control-
ling. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 568 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 846 (E.D. N.Y. 1984); McLaughlin v. Sikorsky
Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1981). Contra Brown v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 42376
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss2/9
NOTES
of the defense. The Court stated that the McKay formulation of the defense
was the proper scope of displacement of state law. 128 Under the Court's new
Boyle test, "liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be im-
posed" when:
(1) the government approves reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conforms to those specifications; and
(3) the contractor warns the government of any dangers in the use of the
equipment known to the contractor but not to the government.1
29
The government's discretionary functions are protected by the first two
elements of the Boyle formulation of the defense. These elements limit the
defense to instances where the government approves reasonably precise
specifications and where the product conforms to these specifications. 30 They
are met only when the government exercises a discretionary function. The
final element, the duty to warn, is necessary to create an incentive for con-
tractors to convey knowledge of a product's risks. 3 ' In the absence of such
an element, the contractor would be tempted to withhold such knowledge
because conveyance of that knowledge would disrupt the procurement con-
tract, while withholding it would produce no liability." 2
The Effect of Boyle
The Boyle Court stated that it was adopting the McKay formulation of
the government contractor defense. 133 However, when the specific elements
of the defense were cited, the Court failed to list the McKay requirement that
the government be immune from liability under the Feres-Stencel doctrine.
As previously discussed, in the Court's search for a principle upon which to
base the defense, Feres-Stencel was considered and rejected." 3 Thus, Boyle
should preclude civilians who are injured by military equipment from bring-
ing suit against the manufacturer of that equipment. 3' The Feres-Stencel doc-
128. Boyle, 56 U.S.L.W. at 7495. The Court considered and rejected the Shaw formulation
of the defense, stating: "While this formulation may represent a perfectly reasonable tort rule,
it is not a rule designed to protect the federal interest embodied in the 'discretionary function'
exemption." Id. at 4796.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 4795.
134. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
135. The dissent agreed with this conclusion:
The contractor may invoke the defense in suits brought not only by military per-
sonnel like Lt. Boyle, or Government employees, but by anyone injured by a Govern-
ment contractor's negligent design, including, for example, the children who might
have died had respondent's helicopter crashed on the beach.
56 U.S.L.W. at 4796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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trine's failure to produce such a result was the reason that the Court rejected
the doctrine as a limiting principle of the defense.
The Boyle formulation of the government contractor defense also provides
some insight into the issue of whether the defense will be limited to military
products. In its statement of the defense, the Court specifically referred to
"military equipment," thus apparently restricting the defense to such equip-
ment. However, the Court provided no definition of military equipment. ,36
And, as previously discussed, many civilian products used to meet govern-
ment needs have been labelled "military products." 137 No matter how the
term "military equipment" is defined by courts, persons injured by defec-
tively designed nonmilitary equipment will apparently have recourse against
the manufacturer of that equipment.13 8 If the defense is now indeed limited
to military equipment, perhaps a more appropriate name for the defense is
the "military equipment defense."
The Court may not have intended to restrict the defense to military equip-
ment. Possibly the Boyle test was intended to apply only to the facts of that
case-facts involving an injury caused by military equipment.'" 9 Perhaps a
different version of the defense would have been given if the case had involved
nonmilitary products.
Conclusion
The government contractor defense recognizes that the government's
management of the procurement process is a discretionary function that must
not be hindered by judicial interference. This is accomplished by extending
to government contractors immunity from products liability suits for injuries
caused by their products. The rationale for this immunity is that for a deci-
sion to be truly discretionary, the government must be free to chose the course
of action that it deems best. Such a choice (being made at the planning level)
should not be subject to review by the courts to determine its correctness.
Instead, only the execution (or operation) of the decision may be evaluated
by the courts.
If a member of the armed services is injured by a military product, he is
prevented from suing the government under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. Because
the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes government liability, the injured
136. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text for other courts' interpretations of this term.
137. See supra note 94 and accompanying text,
138. On the other hand, the dissent felt that:
[Tihe injustice [of the government contractor defense] will extend far beyond the
facts of this case, for the Court's newly discovered government contractor defense
is breathtakingly sweeping. It applies not only to military equipment .... but (so
far as I can tell) to any made-to-order gadget that the Federal Government might
purchase after previewing plans - from NASA's Challenger space shuttle to the
Postal Service's old mail cars.
56 U.S.L.W. at 4796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. But see supra note 138 for the dissent's negative interpretation of this argument.
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serviceman must look to the product's producer for redress. However, under
the Boyle formulation of the government contractor defense, a serviceman
injured by a defectively designed military product will have no judicial remedy.
Thus, when the government contractor defense is successfully asserted, an
injured service member's only compensation will be from the government under
the Veteran's Benefits Act.
The Feres-Stencel doctrine applies only to injured servicemen. Therefore,
courts who base the defense on Feres-Stencel limit the application of the
government contractor defense to servicemen-plaintiffs. Under Boyle, however,
the defense does not include governmental immunity under Feres-Stencel as
an element. Therefore, civilians who are injured by a military product are
now apparently left with no remedy whatsoever.
The government contractor defense now appears to be applicable to both
civilian and military plaintiffs. Thus, both civilian and military plaintiffs are
now barred by Boyle from recovery for injuries caused by defectively designed
military products. The only difference in the application of the defense rests
upon the military/nonmilitary distinction. Under Boyle, the defense does not
preclude suits brought by parties injured by nonmilitary equipment. Thus,
the manufacturer of a defectively designed nonmilitary product cannot assert
the defense regardless of whether the plaintiff is a civilian or a service member.
However, no judicial definition of "military equipment" exists. It will be in-
teresting to see what interpretation the Boyle "military equipment" language
is given by courts in the future.
Brian Shipp
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